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On a cold and cloudy autumn morning in Santiago, Chile I set out for the 
lower middle class neighborhood of Matucana to attend my first Walmart 
protest. I took the subway and walked past auto body repair shops, small 
factories, and hardware stores. The Walmart Supercenter is located on the 
corner of two high traffic streets, several blocks away from the nearest 
residential neighborhood. It is by far the largest supermarket in the area, 
measuring over 75,000 square feet, an imposing building in a neighbor­
hood of small shops.
That day—April 28, 2011—eighty Walmart workers, mostly young 
and middle-aged women came together to hold a union meeting in front 
of the Walmart Matucana store. This was the third reunion en la calle 
(street meeting) that workers across Santiago had organized. Workers 
were meeting in the street because Walmart had recently changed a 
long-standing policy that allowed them to hold lunchtime union meetings in 
the store. Walmart argued that if it allowed the union to have meetings in 
the store that it would then have to allow all kinds of groups to hold 
similar meetings.
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Wait, a union at Walmart? Yes. The majority of Walmart’s 38,000 work­
ers in Chile are unionized. In fact, many workers across Walmart’s global 
operations are unionized. In the case of Chile, Walmart had to agree to 
accept the unions as a condition of entry into the country when it bought 
majority share of the Chilean retail giant D&S in 2009. Even so, many 
more Chilean Walmart workers have been able to organize under Walmart 
proper over the last six years. Not having the right to have union meetings 
in the store during lunch might not strike a U.S. audience as significant, 
especially given Walmart’s antiunionism in the United States, but in Chile 
this struck a nerve with workers and even members of the community. 
Having the ability to meet and discuss union business is considered a fun­
damental right in Chile.
In response to this new policy, Walmart workers and their unions 
decided to take matters into their own hands. Workers organized street 
meetings outside different Walmart stores all across Santiago. They made 
big banners that said “As! Nos Trata Walmart. Tenemos que Hacer Re- 
uniones en la Calle” (This is how Walmart treats us. We have to have 
meetings in the street) and “Walmart Anti-Sindical” (Walmart is anti­
union) and stood in the chilly weather for two hours right outside the 
entrance. They plugged in sound equipment inside the store and spoke 
on microphones about miserable working conditions at Walmart stores. 
As workers spoke up, both customers and other workers stopped and lis­
tened. Additional workers joined the meeting as they rotated shifts.
While the meeting was going on, Walmart managers (all middle-aged 
men) took note of the workers participating and wrote down names. They 
videotaped the entire meeting and forced security guards to stand next to 
workers to intimidate them. But these workers and union leaders were 
not intimidated. They showed their faces without any sign of hesitation or 
fear. At one point during the meeting, Walmart managers asked security to 
unplug the sound system. Eventually Walmart gave up, because workers 
just kept plugging it back in.
These street meetings and demonstrations are bold actions in the face of 
an antiunion employer. In order to participate in these kinds of mobilizing 
efforts, workers must first feel a sense of confidence and collective identity. 
In the case of Walmart Chile, a significant part of their confidence comes 
from participating in a democratic-militant union where they have a voice 
in shaping strategy and decision making. Their local level organizing and
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Figure 1 .1 . Reunion en la Calle (street meeting). Photo by author.
small wins at their particular Walmart store have engaged them more in 
the daily life of the union and have made it easier to stand up to their 
boss. The local union president at Walmart Matucana, Sandra Neida, is a 
charismatic and energetic person committed to social movement unionism
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and democratic principles. At the meeting I attended, workers voted in 
favor of a 10 percent increase in dues in order to improve their capacity 
to fight against Walmart. They also pledged to find a location for a union 
office so that they could hold meetings without relying on their bosses 
for space inside the store, while at the same time maintaining the right to 
have meetings in the store whenever they deem it necessary. This meeting 
is one of many examples of how Chilean Walmart workers have taken 
control over their work lives and are successfully organizing against the 
transnational retail giant.
Worker Activism in the Face of Neoliberalism
There are two striking reasons that Walmart in Chile makes an interesting 
case study. First, it is notable that there is a union at all at Walmart Chile, 
and there are in fact many unions. By contrast, no union has been able to 
penetrate Walmart in the United States in over fifty years. Second, workers 
have organized the most powerful transnational corporation in the world 
in a country that has been described as the “cradle of neoliberalism” since 
the mid-1970s. And Chile, like the United States, has been suffering from 
a declining labor movement. So this advance within Walmart cannot sim­
ply be chalked up to a better national climate, or a more successful, or 
strong, labor movement.
The Rise of Walmart in the United States
Walmart, founded by Sam Walton in Bentonville, Arkansas in 1962, has 
over 4,000 stores in the United States alone, and another 6,283 across 
its global operations (Walmart 2014). What explains Walmart’s rapid 
growth? Lichtenstein (2006) argues that the combination of the agricul­
tural revolution in the American South, and a shift in the U.S. economy 
toward a neoliberal model guaranteed Walmart’s unprecedented growth.
As geographer David Harvey argues, neoliberalism is fundamentally 
about the restoration of class power (Harvey 2005). His argument is based 
on the idea that global elites lost economic and financial power between 
the 1930s and the late 1960s. During this time period unions were strong 
and had effectively fought employers. The Great Depression propelled
Beating the Bully 5
workers and their organizations to fight for the establishment of social 
security, unemployment benefits, welfare, and labor protections through 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). By the early 1970s, the wel­
fare state had taken its toll on profits, and elites needed to act to maintain 
and increase their class power. In short, then, neoliberalism is about a 
system of redistribution back to the one percent. In both the United States 
and Chile, neoliberalism is best characterized as an economic and social 
project driven by the support of free markets, free trade, deregulation, 
privatization, and austerity measures (Harvey 2005). In chapter 2 I dis­
cuss how the neoliberal project was implemented in Chile after the U.S.- 
sponsored military coup against Salvador Allende in 1973. In the United 
States itself, the shift to neoliberal economic policy is most associated with 
Ronald Reagan. His transformation of the business environment through 
privatization and deregulation changed the labor movement for decades 
to come. Of particular importance was Reagan’s dismantling of strong 
antimonopoly legislation (Lynn 2006).
Prior to Reagan, legislation prevented the kind of growth Walmart has 
been able to achieve. At its peak, A&P, the closest competitor to Walmart, 
was only two times larger than its largest competitor. Many big firms 
of the twentieth century were repeatedly taken to court on monopoly 
charges, guaranteeing their limited control. However, Walmart has been 
allowed to expand exponentially with little constraint (Lynn 2006). This 
expansion has had a deleterious impact on its suppliers, who wield very 
little power over this giant, and workers who earn rock bottom wages.
In addition to neoliberal policies that have allowed Walmart’s growth 
to reach epic proportions, the company has received unprecedented subsi­
dies. According to the nonprofit organization Good Jobs First, “Walmart 
has received over $1.2 billion in tax breaks, free land, infrastructure as­
sistance, low-cost financing, and outright grants from state and local 
governments across the country” (Mattera and Purinton 2004). These 
subsidies do not include the additional millions of dollars taxpayers are 
paying to provide health care and income support to Walmart workers 
due to Walmart’s low wages. Because Walmart’s wages are so low, many 
of its workers cannot afford Walmart-sponsored health insurance. In fact, 
Walmart wages are so low that many of its workers qualify for Medicaid 
and other social welfare programs, such as food stamps. Walmart workers 
have reported simultaneously filling out their employment applications
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along with public assistance applications. A 2004 study found Walmart 
workers’ reliance on public assistance programs cost California taxpayers 
$86 million a year. Furthermore, “the families of Walmart employees in 
California utilize an estimated 40 percent more in tax-payer funded health 
care than the average for families of all large retail employees” (Dube and 
Jacobs 2004,1). Walmart’s growth and “everyday low prices” are a direct 
consequence of billions of dollars in direct and indirect subsidies.
Walmart has enjoyed exponential growth, while receiving unprec­
edented tax subsidies, without being required by the state to create good, 
stable, union jobs. On the contrary, Walmart has the reputation for being 
the most antiunion company in the world. U.S. unions have spent millions 
of dollars over the past two decades trying to unionize Walmart, yet each 
campaign has failed to yield a union at Walmart. The nonexistence of a 
union at Walmart cannot be attributed to lack of worker interest. Many 
workers would very much like to be represented by a union, as we have 
seen with various attempts at organizing a union, including OUR Walmart 
(Organization United for Respect at Walmart; Kroll 2013), but Walmart 
spends millions of dollars a year to ensure that U.S. stores will never be 
unionized. With their open-door policy and profit-sharing schemes, anti­
union store manuals, expensive antiunion consultants, and captive audi­
ence meetings, Walmart utilizes an entire industry intended to keep stores 
union free (Lichtenstein 2007).
In addition to classic antiunion strategies, such as captive audience 
meetings, where workers are forced to listen to speeches and watch videos 
on the dangers of unions, and trainings for store managers on how to 
keep unions out of their stores, in 2012 Walmart took an unprecedented 
step in the surveillance of workers who are considered activists with OUR 
Walmart (Brown 2011; Eidelson 2012; Human Rights Watch 2007). OUR 
Walmart was founded in 2011, and initial funding came from the United 
Food & Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), which aimed 
to unionize Walmart. Workers who joined OUR Walmart organizations 
primarily pushed for higher wages and better schedules. The organization 
used creative tactics by calling for a Black Friday strike at Walmart in 
2012. Since then it has been responsible for leading Black Friday strikes 
every year. Although OUR Walmart has not had success in unionizing 
Walmart, their creative tactics and pressure were, in large part, respon­
sible for forcing Walmart to increase their wages to $10 per hour in 2014.
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The organization has also forced Walmart to grant a few other conces­
sions. For example, in 2014 OUR Walmart members launched a cam­
paign called “respect the bump” demanding Walmart to accommodate 
pregnant women with medical conditions, rather than forcing them into 
a leave of absence (OUR Walmart 2014). In 2015, journalists discovered 
that leading up to the first Black Friday strike, Walmart contracted Lock­
heed Martin, the world’s largest defense contractor, to help with surveil­
lance of OUR Walmart activists and to monitor who participated in the 
Black Friday strikes (Berfield 2015).
Walmart has been able to grow because of deregulation, tax benefits, 
trade policy, health policy, its locations in right to work states,' weak 
labor law, the general decline of the U.S. labor movement, and a collec­
tion of old and new union busting tactics. Today Walmart has all but 
saturated the rural, suburban, and exurban retail markets in the United 
States. However, it has been experiencing a growth crisis since 2004, espe­
cially since it has not been able to penetrate important urban markets such 
as New York City. In order for it to continue to grow it needs to move 
to urban markets and new markets globally. Its survival as a profitable 
company that trades well on the New York Stock Exchange hinges on an 
urban and global strategy. With those considerations in mind, Walmart 
went global.
Walmart Goes Global
Walmart began its international operations in 1991 with the opening 
of a Sam’s Club near Mexico City (Walmart 2015). Within a few years, 
Walmart had opened hundreds of Walmart and Sam’s Club stores through­
out Mexico. As of 2015 it had retail operations in twenty-eight coun­
tries and employed over a million retail workers internationally (Walmart 
2015). There are many more workers across Walmart’s supply chain, 
but we do not have accurate information about these workers, because 
Walmart does not directly employ them. Walmart’s international opera­
tions comprised about 30 percent of its net sales in 2015 (Walmart 2015). 
In Latin America, Walmart operates in Mexico (2,296 stores), Costa Rica
1. Right to work laws prohibit agreements between unions and employers. As of 2016 , 
twenty-six states have right to work statutes in the United States.
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Figure 1 .2 . W alm art’s international retail stores by region 
Source: Author’s calculation from www.walmartstores.com.
(219 stores), El Salvador (89 stores), Guatemala (217 stores), Hondu­
ras (81 stores), Nicaragua (86 stores), Brazil (559 stores), Argentina (107 
stores), and as of 2016 its most recent acquisition in the region, Chile (386 
stores). Clearly, Latin America presents a significant share of Walmart’s 
global operations.
As a global company Walmart has had varying success in different coun­
tries. It has failed in Germany and Japan but has had huge success in Latin 
America. Since it first expanded overseas, Walmart has had to fine-tune its 
approach. It has had to learn the hard lesson that it cannot simply replicate 
the same model in every country. Institutional context and culture play 
a significant role in the success and failure of Walmart as a global player 
(Tilly 2006). What has become evident is that the Walmart model must be 
flexible and respond to country specific circumstances. As such, in most 
countries in the world, many of which have stronger labor laws than the 
United States, Walmart has had to accept unions. Nonetheless, accepting 
unions doesn’t mean that Walmart has not tried to push the boundaries of 
labor law and exert antiunion practices. It has taken particular kinds of 
unions to be successful in fighting the worst of Walmart’s policies.
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Neoliberal reforms in Chile in the 1980s and 1990s restructured an 
entire society and created a new consumer culture that significantly fa­
cilitated the expansion first of D&S (Walmart’s big box predecessor) and 
then of Walmart (see chapter 2). Given these dramatic changes in Chilean 
policy and culture, such significant worker mobilization against Walmart 
in Chile is striking. How do we explain workers’ success in Chile, the 
cradle of neoliberalism, in challenging the world’s largest and most anti­
union corporation? What does an in-depth case study show us about how 
union democracy, autonomy, militancy, and strategic capacity are devel­
oped? And what are the implications for the United States and other coun­
tries organizing against Walmart? The answers to these questions lie in a 
deeper understanding of worker power.
Understanding Worker Power
At first glance Chile is an unlikely location for a strong worker movement. 
The dictatorship’s legacy, coupled with a declining labor movement, does 
not make a good foundation. Paradoxically, it is precisely these condi­
tions that have given rise to the unique opportunities that have facilitated 
worker activism in Walmart Chile.
Chilean workers are successfully organizing and bargaining at Walmart 
because they have learned to leverage power in resourceful ways. Walmart 
in Chile offers an interesting case study because it contains two different 
industries: retail, and warehouse. Retail and warehouse workers leverage 
their power in different ways, leading to different kinds of social power.
Types of Social Power
Since Chilean Walmart workers are already unionized, in this book I pri­
marily focus on organized workers and their movements. As such, one of 
the main contributions of this book is to look at how different types of so­
cial power can be mobilized by different actors within one vertically in­
tegrated transnational corporation. The power that workers can leverage 
therefore affects strategy and outcomes. In previous work (Bank 2008), 
I’ve looked at the process of production and how different types of labor 
control (hegemonic and despotic) are used to produce and reproduce race
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and gender at the point of production. This project, by contrast, looks at 
how workers turn that labor control on its head by leveraging their social 
power to force Walmart to meet many of their demands.
What is social power? What does it mean to have social power? Like 
Jenkins (2002) and Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1978), 
I argue that social power means having the capacity for disruption. Effec­
tive strike threats can sometimes be just as powerful as actually going on 
strike. Jenkins (2002) argues that “oppressed people can only transcend 
the limitations imposed by elite decision-makers when they have the power 
to force the institutions they are confronting to accept their demands” 
(62). Furthermore, Piven and Cloward (1978) state that this disruptive 
power should not necessarily have to be rooted in institutions (such as 
unions) in order to be effective. In fact, they provocatively argue that it 
is when these movements organize into formal institutions/organizations 
that they begin to lose their power. They argue that it was disruptive ac­
tion that made such movements as the Civil Rights, unemployed workers, 
and welfare rights movements—all without structural power—the most 
successful.
Yet another kind of power is power rooted in the cultural and public 
spheres, what Jennifer Chun (2009) calls “symbolic leverage.” Chun ar­
gues that, “symbolic leverage aims to undermine official sources of author­
ity, such as the law, and demand alternative applications of social justice” 
(2009, xiii). A prominent example of this kind of leverage is the Justice for 
Janitors Campaign that the International Service Workers Union waged 
in the late 1980s and 1990s, where the strength of the strike, came from 
elevating the poor working conditions of janitors to a moral level. Chun 
(2009) makes a particularly important intervention in the labor literature, 
which has historically privileged workers with structural power. In the 
United States this has largely taken the form of scholarship on the white, 
male working class. Yet the 1990s saw a revitalization of the U.S. labor 
movement by immigrants and women (Fantasia and Voss 2004; Milk­
man 2000; Milkman and Voss 2004,). Furthermore, the immigrants and 
women organizing were predominantly in the service sector. As a result, 
Chun (2009) articulates the need to think of power differently, especially 
among insecure, low-wage, and service sector workers. For these workers, 
symbolic leverage allows them to shift the balance of power and apply 
upward pressure in their demands for better working conditions.
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Building on Jenkins (2002), Piven and Cloward (1978), and Chun 
(2009), I argue that there are two main types of social power: having the 
capacity for symbolic disruption and having the capacity for disrupting 
production. These are not necessarily mutually exclusive, though some­
times they are. Another way to think about it is power that disrupts the 
supply side (services) and power that disrupts the demand side (produc­
tion). As Jenkins (2002, 62) argues, “social power must be based in some 
capacity of the group itself to coerce the decision-maker to make the 
changes they seek.” Actions that we traditionally think of in relationship 
to labor movements, such as strikes, threats of strikes, direct action, and 
other strategies that stop production, slow down production or otherwise 
impact the employer’s bottom line represent the capacity to disrupt pro­
duction. Symbolic disruption also has the power to coerce employers to 
acquiesce to workers’ demands, but uses different methods, such as sham­
ing, public drama, and moral authority (Chun 2009). Even though the 
capacity for disrupting production and the capacity for symbolic disrup­
tion are not mutually exclusive, not all workers have the same access to 
these different kinds of disruption.
Determinants of Social Power
How do workers get social power? How do they attain the capacity for 
disruption? Erik Olin Wright (2000, 962) argues that power is “the ca­
pacity of individuals and organizations to realize class interests.” He 
defines two kinds of worker power. The first, “associational” power, 
is the power that “results from the formation of collective organiza­
tions of workers” including political parties and unions. The second, 
“structural” power, “results simply from the location of workers in 
an economic system” (Wright 2000, 962). I agree with Wright (2000) 
about the importance of associational and structural power, but I devi­
ate from his analysis that these are forms of power on their own. Rather, 
I argue that associational and structural power are determinants of so­
cial power. In other words, having a union, worker center, or politi­
cal party on its own does not produce social power. It is what people 
do with those organizations that can create power. Similarly, structural 
location alone does not create power; it is how workers leverage their 
structural location that offers the opportunity to gain power. Under this
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conception, associational power allows for the production of both sym­
bolic disruption and disruption of production, while structural power 
most commonly facilitates disruption of production. Since leveraging 
power implies some level of organization (associational power), I would 
additionally argue that workers must have associational power in order 
to leverage structural power. For example, Silver (2003), Bonacich and 
Wilson (2008) and others have pointed out that logistics workers occupy 
a key structural position in the supply chain and can bring global sup­
ply chains to a halt. However, if these workers are not organized, they 
are not going to leverage their structural power effectively.2 Therefore, 
strong associational power, whether in unions or other working-class or­
ganizations, is instrumental to building the capacity for effective disrup­
tion and garnering increased social power.
Characteristics of Strong Associational Power
How do workers and their organizations build strong associational 
power? There are three central components: strategic capacity, union de­
mocracy, and militancy. Additionally, autonomy from political parties 
and state control, while not a condition for building strategic capacity, 
union democracy, and militancy, gives organizations the freedom to think 
independently.
Strategic Capacity In his 2010 book, Why David Sometimes Wins, Mar­
shall Ganz argues that the United Farm Workers of America (UFW) was 
able to more successfully organize farm workers and win against growers 
than the Teamsters Union or the Agricultural Workers Organizing Com­
mittee (AWOC) of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Indus­
trial Organizations (AFL-CIO) because they had the ability to “devise 
good strategy” or have strategic capacity. For Ganz,
2. The case studies in this book focus on workers who are already in unions, but I am 
not arguing that workers who are not in unions cannot leverage their structural location. 
When I talk about “organization” I mean that workers have a relatively strong sense of 
class-consciousness and the potential for collective action whether or not they belong to an 
organization.
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An organ ization  is m o re  likely to  achieve positive ou tcom es if it develops 
m ore effective strategy, and it is m ore likely to  develop m ore effective s tra t­
egy if its leaders can  access diverse sources o f  salient in form ation , em ploy  
heuristic processes, and d em on strate  deep m o tiv atio n — their strategic c a p a c ­
ity. V ariation in strategic cap acity , again , derives from  differences in lead ers’ 
life experien ce, n etw ork s and repertoires, and organ izatio n s’ deliberative  
processes, resource flow s, and acco u n tab ility  structures. (2 0 0 0 ,  1 0 1 9 )
Much like Ganz, I argue that leadership and organization drive the Chil­
ean Walmart warehouse and independent retail unions’ ability to “de­
vise good strategy” or have strategic capacity. Like the UFW in Ganz’s 
discussion, the Chilean unionists I worked with, in both the retail and 
warehouse unions, were deeply motivated in their desire to build a pow­
erful democratic grassroots union, particularly in Walmart, which was 
widely seen as an imperialist transnational corporation. They also bene- 
fitted from salient information and employed heuristic processes. For ex­
ample, leveraging information about the sale of D&S to Walmart, and 
experimenting with different tactics. Differences in these organizations 
strategies (see chapter 3) stem from their structural location in addition to 
leadership and organization. In his model, Ganz (2000, 2010) points to 
the centrality of deliberative processes, resource flows, and accountabil­
ity structures but only vaguely references the concept of union democracy. 
Here I differ from Ganz, because Walmart workers in Chile had union de­
mocracy as a central concern in the creation of their unions. For the Chil­
ean unionists, in large part union democracy drives their organizations’ 
deep motivation, deliberative processes, and accountability structures. But 
what exactly is meant by union democracy?
Union Democracy The concept of union democracy has been hotly de­
bated in the literature on union revitalization. There are many camps 
within the literature, with little consistency in how the concept is defined 
or considered. One set of scholars largely focuses on formal democratic 
processes such as representation, constitution, politics, and elections 
(Cook 1963; Dimick 2010; Edelstein and Warner 1976; Lipset et al. 1956; 
Stepan-Norris 1997; Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1989 and 1996). Within 
this group, scholars have vastly different takes on the role of formal de­
mocracy inside unions. The argument dates back at least sixty years, when
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Lipset and colleagues (1956) derided the potential for unions to be dem­
ocratic and representative organizations. Instead, they found that unions 
tended toward oligarchy. More than three decades later, Stepan-Norris 
(1997) and Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin (1989, 1996) presented a far more 
nuanced analysis, arguing that there are a multitude of paths for unions, 
and which path they take, whether tending toward democracy or oligar­
chy, is largely determined by internal political processes and factions.
By contrast, a more recent set of scholars focuses primarily on par­
ticipatory democracy or active worker participation in campaigns and 
organizing (Bronfenbrenner and Friedman 1998; Hickey et al. 2010; 
Markowitz 1998, 1999; Milkman 2006; Sharpe 2004; Voss 2010; Voss 
and Gaston 2014; Voss and Sherman 2000). In this body of literature the 
central question of concern has been how do unions activate the rank and 
file? Most studies look at specific union campaigns, highlighting whether 
they use top-down or bottom-up strategies, or both. Their concern has 
been less on formal democracy and more on successful strategies for acti­
vating membership and winning.
Markowitz (1998) identifies the “blitz model” and the “comprehen­
sive campaign model” as responses to employer antiunion hostility in 
the 1980s.3 The UFCW developed the comprehensive campaign, which 
she describes as a campaign driven by the union, which relies on re­
search to find unfavorable things about the employer and then uses the 
research as leverage to force the employer into a card check neutrality 
agreement, rather than a National Labor Relations Board election (which 
in the 1980s and 1990s was particularly unfavorable to workers). The 
comprehensive campaign required substantial secrecy and little worker 
participation.
By contrast, the blitz model developed by the Amalgamated Clothing 
and Textile Workers Union (now UNITE) focused heavily on worker par­
ticipation, by getting workers to organize intensively for a short period of
3. The Blitz model is an organizing model where union staff are sent to a particular 
location that has a heated union battle to work on it for a short, intense period of time and 
then moves to the next location. The critique of the model is that workers do not develop a 
strong connection to the union because the staff member leaves once the campaign is won or 
lost. The comprehensive campaign is a different organizing model. Here the union organizing 
campaign is developed through the heavy integration of research, coalition building, political 
pressure, and legal pressure.
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time and limiting the campaign period so as to catch employers off guard 
and unprepared. The blitz model also required some level of secrecy, es­
pecially in the beginning, but later it required much more rank-and-file 
involvement. Markowitz goes on to argue that both models excluded 
workers from actively participating in the collective bargaining agree­
ment, but workers who participated in the blitz model pushed their union 
to let them participate in the process, whereas workers who were part 
of the comprehensive campaign simply assumed it was not their role to 
participate in bargaining. In the end the workers who participated in the 
blitz model, though somewhat discouraged after the campaign, ended up 
actively participating in the union a lot longer than workers who par­
ticipated in the comprehensive campaign. In her study, Markowitz makes 
some interesting observations about the tensions between worker partici­
pation and union strategy.
Sharpe also sheds some light on the difficult balance between creat­
ing a space for worker participation and leadership and the union staff’s 
need to “carefully manage and control the course of the campaign” (2004, 
64). For Sharpe, the balance between building worker leadership and staff 
management is delicate, especially in the context of fighting antiunion em­
ployers with huge resources. Sharpe’s piece captures the internal struggles 
that union staff face in having a strong desire to foster a democratic pro­
cess among militant and engaged members, all the while trying to ensure 
winning the campaign.
In the blitz model, unions were extraordinarily effective at cultivating 
leadership and activism among the rank and file. Ultimately, strategic 
decisions were not made by rank-and-file workers, but rather by ex­
perts. The Sharpe (2004) and Markowitz (1998, 1999) studies especially 
point out the contradictions and tensions between union staff and the 
rank and file. On the one hand, most unions and union organizers want 
to cultivate a union culture that builds worker power and puts mem­
bers in control of decision making. On the other hand, U.S. employ­
ers often wage incredibly hostile antiunion campaigns, and even once 
workers are organized, negotiating a collective bargaining agreement is 
extraordinarily difficult. As a result, U.S. labor campaigns, whether to 
form a union or negotiate a contract, become high-stakes endeavors. 
Because of the employer offensive against unions, many unions, particu­
larly large unions with many resources, employ a small army of union
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professionals, including lawyers, organizers, researchers, lobbyists, and 
even finance specialists. As the daily work of the union becomes profes­
sionalized it often takes strategy and decision-making out of the hands 
of actual union members. Therefore there is a constant balancing act 
between building members’ own power and ensuring success through a 
multi-pronged approach.
The final group of scholars writing about union democracy brings to­
gether formal democracy and member participation. These scholars argue 
that union democracy requires formal democratic processes, a high level 
of worker participation and engagement on a day-to-day basis, and sig­
nificant power in the union’s strategic decision-making and political pro­
cess (Levesque et al. 2005; Levi et al. 2009; Moody 1997, 2007; Parker 
and Gruelle 1999; Walchuk 2011; Weinbaum 2004). In her three case 
studies of factory closures in Appalachia (Greenbrier, Acme, and General 
Electric), Eve Weinbaum makes a case for “successful failures.” While all 
three grassroots movements in response to factory closures failed to bring 
back jobs, they were successful in that they deeply empowered workers. 
As a result of the campaigns workers gained hands-on skills in the areas of 
strategy, democratic processes, the global economy, and employer tactics. 
In many cases workers’ direct control over their movements facilitated 
long-term participation in the labor movement. Weinbaum’s study shows 
us how grassroots movements can be transformative, even if they are not 
successful. Similarly, Moody argues that democracy and militancy are the 
only ways to turn the U.S. labor movement around. Using Canadian data, 
Levesque et al. (2005) find that union democracy is a key tool in address­
ing membership dissatisfaction and bringing together collective identities.
My discussion of union democracy relies on the approach of this third 
camp. What sets the independent Walmart unions apart from the other 
Chilean Walmart unions, Chile’s mainstream labor movement, and 
many unions in the United States is their commitment to base-building, 
bottom-up strategy, democratic structures, and membership participa­
tion. What is particularly unique is that these unions are fighting the 
world’s largest transnational corporation with nearly no resources. Unlike 
most unions in the United States, neither the warehouse or retail unions 
I worked with had paid staff or political, organizing, or education de­
partments. The best resourced unions I worked with only had the luxury 
of a part-time attorney and release time for the president of the union,
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allowing her or him to attend to the daily aspects of running a union. 
Most of these unions do not even have offices. These unions are run by 
and for the rank and file. Union democracy has both influenced the stra­
tegic capacity of these organizations and also has helped build stronger 
associational power, since these organizations have the tools to coerce 
employers into meeting many of their demands.
Militancy A third component that contributes to building strong as­
sociational power is militancy. By militancy, I mean confrontational, 
disruptive, direct action tactics that workers and their organizations 
use to coerce employers to meet their demands (Isaac and Christian­
sen 2002). These actions involve significant economic, legal, or polit­
ical risk for actors and can include actions such as strikes, blockades, 
and sabotage. Measuring militancy is difficult, since not all actions are 
recorded and categorized. Scholars often use strikes as a variable to 
measure militancy. Of course there are severe limitations to the data, be­
cause often countries count only legal strikes in the official data. Despite 
its limitations, looking at strike data is helpful in gaining an understand­
ing of waves of militancy.
Militant action has long been an important tool for unions to force 
their employers’ hand. Historically, U.S. strikes have been effective at 
crippling employers. In the 1930s, autoworkers, port workers, and steel 
workers all waged important strikes (Lichtenstein 1995; Selvin 1996; 
Turrini 1997). U.S. labor law always included a provision that allowed 
employers to replace workers, but it was not until 1938 with the Su­
preme Court decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &  Telegraph Co. that 
employers were essentially given the right to permanently replace strik­
ing workers. This Supreme Court decision had a significant impact on 
the strength of the strike. Nonetheless, U.S. strike activity was strong 
through the late 1940s, in fact labor unrest peaked in 1945-46, with 
over 5,000 strikes each year (Dubofsky 1995). However, U.S. strike ac­
tion has dramatically declined since the mid-1970s. In 2009, the United 
States experienced an all-time low with only five strikes, and in 2015 
there were twelve strikes, leaving about 47,000 workers idle (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2016).
At the same time as we see low levels of militant action in the United 
States, we see increasing labor militancy in the Global South. As Silver
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(2003, 5) astutely points out, “while labor has been weakened in the loca­
tions from which productive capital emigrated, new working classes have 
been created and strengthened in the favored new sites of investment.” 
Since 2010, for example, we have seen extraordinary mobilizations in 
Asia, particularly China.
Labor militancy contributes to a sense of collective identity, increased 
class-consciousness, and a sense of empowerment even when workers’ ac­
tions and movements fail to produce benefits (Weinbaum 2004). As such, 
militancy helps to forge stronger relationships, high levels of motivation, les­
sons, and capacity, all of which contribute to stronger associational power.
Worker Power in Chile
As in the United States, workers in Chile have been consistently losing 
power since the mid-1970s (see chapter 2). It is especially counterintui­
tive that in a small country known for its probusiness climate that retail 
and warehouse workers have challenged Walmart, the world’s most anti­
union corporation. Yet Walmart workers in Chile have been leveraging 
power in creative ways and achieving gains at the same time that there has 
arguably been a decline in worker power overall. In this context, how did 
workers build power in the first place? How did they learn to leverage the 
power that they built?
Suffice it to say that workers’ movements do not occur in a vacuum. 
In the mid-2000s, Chile witnessed an explosion of social movements, 
starting with protests led by high school students. In 2007 many com­
mentators considered a wave of worker strikes to be the reemergence of 
the Chilean labor movement (Aravena and Nunez 2009). The Logistica, 
Transporte, Servicios (LTS) union, representing warehouse workers, or­
ganized in 2006, and the independent retail workers’ unions organized 
between 2006 and 2011. These unions shared a number of important 
characteristics. First, they all had a commitment to autonomy. None of 
the unions I worked with were interested in participating in the national 
labor federation (Central Unitaria de Trabajadores), nor were the leaders 
of the unions interested in furthering their careers through the socialist or 
communist political parties. They had a strong belief that the labor move­
ment was weak, at least in part, because workers had been used as tools
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of the political elite and had received little in exchange for their political 
loyalties.4
Second, they all shared a commitment to building grassroots unions 
with a focus on union democracy and militancy. Many had negative ex­
periences with corrupt or ineffectual unions. Some of them had union ex­
periences prior to Walmart, while others had been members of Walmart’s 
own corrupt union (see chapter 2) before breaking away and creating 
their own organizations. All of them were committed to building a dif­
ferent kind of labor organization, what they referred to as a sindicato de 
uerdad (a real union) and a sindicato de base (a grassroots union). What 
they articulated clearly was that in order to build worker power, worker 
organizations had to be democratically driven from their bases. For these 
workers, building a democratic union meant giving decision-making 
power to the membership and allowing members to drive their union’s 
agenda from below. In addition to union democracy, the union leaders 
I interviewed emphasized that in order to build power, workers needed to 
take risks and engage in militant action. They especially believed this was 
true in challenging Walmart, because they were well aware of Walmart’s 
reputation as an antiunion employer.
The unions I worked with have all been successful in building worker 
power at Walmart and at negotiating good contracts. As autonomous 
unions they have been able to create the conditions for building strategic 
capacity, union democracy, and militancy. These characteristics have all 
contributed to building strong associational power. Yet important vari­
ances contribute to how and why these unions have succeeded. Ultimately, 
retail and warehouse workers have different kinds of social power and 
therefore leverage their resources differently.
Warehouse workers have a tremendous amount of structural power 
because of their unique position in the industry. Because there are only 
three central Walmart warehouses in Chile, if these workers go on strike
4. Unions in Chile have historically been considered beholden to political parties (par­
ticularly the communist and socialist parties). It is one of the ways in which they were able 
to create a significant role for themselves in shaping the Chilean democracy. However, they 
were unable to extract significant change at the level of government policy outside of those 
political parties (Angell 1972).
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they can paralyze Walmart’s distribution of goods. Since these workers 
have a union, they also have associational power. Still, the strength of 
associational power is directly correlated with the strength of the union. 
Walmart warehouse workers are represented by two unions. LTS, the 
union I worked with, represents 2,000 workers at the two main ware­
houses. The third warehouse, initially created to undermine LTS, was or­
ganized in 2014 by the parcel company DHL’s union, for reasons having 
to do with subcontracting and tax identification numbers (see chapter 2 
for a discussion of labor law). Walmart warehouse workers’ combination 
of structural and associational power has led them to engage in classic 
disruption. They staged a powerful strike in 2006 that shaped the union’s 
organization, strategic capacity, and union democracy. As a result of the 
power that they have built, they have made substantial economic advance­
ments through collective bargaining. These include significant wage in­
creases, vacation time, a union office, health and safety provisions, and 
more (see chapter 4).
Walmart retail workers are distributed across over 300 different stores, 
ranging from small corner stores with ten employees, to Walmart Super­
centers with over 400 employees. Because of the labor code, these work­
ers are also distributed across eighty different unions. In general, these 
workers have associational power, in that most Walmart retail workers 
are members of a union, but there are stronger and weaker unions within 
Walmart itself. Retail workers, however, as a whole have limited structural 
power. Nonetheless, even in retail, some structural power can be leveraged 
and is leveraged in terms of different occupations within the retail stores. 
Cashiers, butchers, bakers, and fishmongers have significantly more struc­
tural power than stockers, in part because they are seen as skilled labor 
and therefore harder to replace. The two retail federations I worked with 
represent about 4,000 members (across thirty different enterprise unions). 
FENATRALID, the oldest, was organized in 2006, while Federacion 
Autonoma was created in 2010. In addition, there are three other federa­
tions, including a corrupt union that represents about 14,000 workers. 
FENATRALID, the Federacion Autonoma, and the unions that belong to 
them have had success in breaking the corrupt union’s weak pattern agree­
ment, thereby raising wages and improving bonuses and benefits, though 
not nearly to the level of the warehouse workers’ (see chapters 2 and 5). 
However, it is arguable that some of their most significant victories have
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been on noneconomic issues. In this way, the retail unions have used the 
strength of their associational power to wage campaigns that have used 
both symbolic disruption and classic disruption.
This case study illustrates how types and determinants of social power 
play out differently and interact in various ways in separate sites (retail 
and logistics) of a vertically integrated transnational corporation. The 
types of power available to workers influence their tactics and objectives. 
Making effective use of the types of power at hand, as have these autono­
mous unions, influences outcomes. They have been able to build demo­
cratic and militant unions with significant strategic capacity. These three 
factors—union democracy, militancy, and strategic capacity—have con­
tributed to their strong associational power, which they have effectively 
leveraged through their symbolic disruptive capacity and their capacity 
for disrupting production. In addition, the warehouse workers benefit 
from structural power, which has allowed them to build capacity for dis­
rupting production.
Methodology
In 2009, during a three-week visit to my family in Santiago, Chile, I dis­
covered that Walmart had purchased a majority share of D&S, one of the 
largest retail chains in Chile. I became fascinated with the development of 
Walmart in Chile. Foreign, big-box chain stores have had limited success 
in Chile, JCPenney, Sears, Home Depot, and Carrefour have all failed.5 
I was interested in seeing how Walmart would do. Chile also provides an 
interesting example, because, since the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Al- 
lende, a democratically elected Socialist president, Chile has pursued a 
neoliberal, free-market approach including vast privatization, export-led 
development, and opening up to foreign investment. Chile has been hailed
5. JCPenney and Carrefour survived for five years, Home Depot for four. Ultimately, 
national Chilean companies bought out all of these stores. Part of the problem for these 
global companies is that retailing in Chile is extremely competitive in a relatively small market 
(population 16 ,000 ,000 ). Another problem is the credit system. Most major retailers in Chile 
have their own credit cards and banks that generously add to their profitability. The situation 
for Walmart is different, because they bought out a national chain.
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as Latin America’s “free-market miracle.” Under these economic condi­
tions, it would seem that the Walmart model had the potential to flourish.
In 2 0 1 1 ,1 returned to Chile on a Fulbright for seven months to under­
stand Walmart’s impact. I was originally interested in the role of Peruvian 
immigrants in the retail industry, but once I arrived in Santiago and con­
nected with the UFCW, I became increasingly interested in the relationship 
between Chilean unions and Walmart. Since there are no unions to rep­
resent Walmart workers in the United States, it was especially interesting 
to observe how workers at unionized Walmart stores and warehouses in 
Chile were faring.
I made various strategic choices in designing the methodology for this 
project. I decided that I was not interested in interviewing Walmart man­
agement. Unlike my previous work (Bank Munoz 2008) in which I spent 
significant time interviewing management, in this project I really wanted 
to focus on workers and their unions. I made this decision because there is 
a well-established literature on the Walmart business model that I did not 
feel needed repeating.
I was first able to gain access to Walmart unions in Chile through a 
contact in the UFCW in the United States. After I made the initial contact 
and had a better sense of the lay of the land, I made contacts with two 
retail federations and seven unions. I also felt strongly about interviewing 
suppliers for Walmart in Chile. This proved to be a very difficult task, 
since most suppliers were nervous or scared about revealing too much 
information about their relationships with Walmart. I was able to make 
contact with two suppliers, and from there I was able to use snowball 
sampling to gain access to eight more suppliers.
In short, I conducted seven months of ethnographic fieldwork in Chile 
from December 2010 to July 2011. During the course of the seven months 
I conducted in-depth interviews with a total of forty-five participants: ten 
Walmart suppliers, five union presidents, seven union leaders, the head of 
the small business association, two union lawyers, and twenty Walmart 
workers. Follow up interviews occurred from 2012-2015 during shorter 
visits to Chile. Pseudonyms are used for many of the participants, how­
ever some of them wanted me to use their real names. Therefore there is 
a mix of pseudonyms and real names throughout the book. In addition, 
I was a participant observer at weekly union meetings, union rallies, and 
quarterly union membership meetings. I also spent a significant amount of
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time going to different Walmart stores and warehouses and observing the 
workplace environment. I was able to obtain secondary data from unions, 
the Chilean Ministry of Labor, and Walmart’s website. In addition, I have 
a collection of Chilean and U.S. newspaper articles on Walmart in Chile.
As with all social science research, the methodological choices I made 
in this process led to limitations in the data. I didn’t interview a random 
sample of Walmart workers. I interviewed union activists and union lead­
ers. I didn’t interview representatives of all eighty-two Walmart unions, 
because I was most interested in unions that were engaged in actual or­
ganizing. I have attempted to correct for some of the limitations through 
participant observation. Participating on a daily and weekly basis with 
various unions gave me insights that I would not have been privy to by 
only conducting in-depth interviews. In all, I attended about twenty union 
meetings and two union assemblies.
This project is both an academic study and an organizing project; it is 
not a value-neutral project. I was not only interested in learning about how 
Chilean unions are dealing with Walmart, I was also interested in participat­
ing in their efforts. And workers, union leaders, and community organiza­
tions were all interested in developing and deepening their practices. They 
wanted to learn about the U.S. labor movement, just as much as I wanted 
to learn about their struggles. The result was to slowly build transnational 
ties between the U.S. labor movement and the Chilean labor movement.
As a U.S. academic, opportunities to build transnational labor solidar­
ity do not come knocking at my door frequently. I am grateful to have the 
opportunity to be working with incredible people in both the Chilean and 
U.S. labor movements. However, building these bridges is not always easy 
or straightforward. During my time in Chile, there were concerns on the 
Chilean side about how much to trust U.S. unions. On the U.S. side, the 
organizations I was working with wanted to know how representative of 
all Walmart workers the independent unions were, and how serious they 
were about fighting Walmart. Those dynamics put me right in the middle. 
As a Chilean I felt loyal to the unions I had relationships with. I wanted 
to make sure that I wasn’t overstepping my role in trying to make these 
connections. I wanted to make sure they would be able to remain autono­
mous. There are far too many examples in transnational organizing of U.S. 
unions assuming they had all the right answers. This kind of arrogance 
has hurt more than one campaign. Conversely, I have deeper relationships 
with the U.S. labor movement. I did not want them to put their scarce
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resources into Chilean unions that liked giving a good speech but weren’t 
going to do more than that. In short, I wanted and needed to be seen as 
legitimate to both sides. The people one works with in each organization 
make a huge difference in terms of relationship building. Fortunately, the 
Americans I was working with from the UFCW and Change-to-Win were 
respectful and interested in learning from the Chilean unions. They did 
not arrogantly assume they had all the right answers. They were interested 
in building a long-term relationship. The Chilean unions were equally in­
terested in learning from their U.S. counterparts. They set aside some of 
their preconceived notions about “Americans” and opened up to me as a 
researcher and to the unions. Of course, no relationships are free of ten­
sions or disagreements—this is also true for these actors.
Overview of the Book
In chapter 2 ,1 lay out the importance of institutional context in Walmart’s 
global expansion. Walmart has not effectively been able to replicate its 
model wholesale across countries and continents. It has had to adapt to 
culture, politics, and regulatory climate. In this chapter, I explore the Chil­
ean labor movement and labor code and explain their role in Walmart’s 
particular model in Chile. I draw comparisons to Walmart in the United 
States and Walmart’s other global operations.
In Chapter 3 , 1 present the analytical framework for the book. I argue 
that the warehouse union can be characterized by what I call strate­
gic democracy, whereas the retail unions are characterized by flexible 
militancy. The warehouse workers have significant structural power, a 
tradition of political education, leaders with trade union experience, 
and a deeper culture of union democracy. As a result they have been 
particularly successful in achieving economic gains. The retail workers 
are newer unions with weaker social power but a strong culture of au­
tonomy and militancy, and democratic structures. They have achieved 
some economic gains and have significantly and effectively challenged 
Walmart culture. These two models of unionism set up the case studies 
in chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 4 looks at the warehouse union in detail. Here I explore work­
place abuses, organizing strategy, and outcomes. Here I give life to the 
conceptual framework in chapter 3 by illustrating how the warehouse
